[Iowa-dx] I REALLY REALLY Recommend This Book!

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Excerpt: 'Daydream Believers'

by Fred Kaplan

Daydream Believers

NPR.org, February 5, 2008 =B7 Nearly all of America's blunders in war and
peace these past few years stem from a single grand misconception: that
the world changed after September 11, when in fact it didn't.

Certainly things about the world changed, not least Americans' sudden
awareness that they were vulnerable. But the way the world works=97the
nature of power, warfare, and politics among nations=97remained essentially
the same.

A real change, a seismic shift in global politics, had taken place a
decade earlier, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the
Cold War. Yet America's political leaders at the start of the
twenty-first century misunderstood this shift=97and in a way that their
misreading of 9/11 would exacerbate.

George W. Bush and his top aides in the White House and the Pentagon came
to office believing that the United States had emerged from its Cold War
victory as the world's ''sole superpower'' and that they could therefore
do pretty much as they pleased: issue orders and expect obeisance, topple
rogue regimes at will, honor alliances and treaties when they were
useful, and disregard them when they weren't.

But in fact, the end of the Cold War made America weaker, less capable of
exerting its will on others. And its leaders' failure to recognize this,
their inclination to devise policies based on the premise of omnipotence,
made America weaker still.

For all its rigidities and horrors, the Cold War was a system of
international order and security. Most nations fell into one of two
camps: the American-led West or the Soviet-controlled East. In exchange
for their loyalty or submission, these countries received guarantees of
protection. The collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 meant the
collapse of this system=97and the evaporation of the threat whose very
existence had bolstered America's power and influence.

As long as there were two superpowers, the countries in between often
felt compelled to pay fealty to their protector's interests, even when
those interests collided with their own. Now, in a world with just one
superpower, there was no fulcrum of pressure, no common looming enemy, to
keep the bloc in line. Many of America's allies remained allied, whether
out of inertia, shared values, shared interests, or a continuing desire
for security. But they were also free to go their own way, pursue their
own interests, form their own alliances of convenience, without much
regard to Washington's thoughts about the matter.

There were two traditional courses a president might have taken to
preserve American influence in this geopolitical setting. One was to don
the mantle of explicit empire: build up vast armies, deploy them
worldwide, and not hesitate to unleash them when necessary. But there was
neither the money nor the manpower for a truly imperial army; nor did the
American people have the stomach for prolonged engagement in brutal,
distant wars.

The other course was to revitalize alliances, renovating the old ones,
cultivating new ones, forging as many links around as many issues and
interests as possible. A president could have taken this course for
purely pragmatic reasons. Powerful nations, especially powerful
democracies, have always needed allies, if not to get a job done, then to
get it done with shared burdens and legitimacy=97to get it done and keep it
done. And in a world with no opposing superpower to cement its alliances
by default, the United States would need allies more than ever and would
have to work harder at diplomacy to lure=97and keep=97them on board.

Few in high office recognized this paradox of power. To President George
W. Bush and most of his aides (as well as the Republican-controlled
Congress, many editorial-page writers, and a growing number of
Democrats), American power seemed not merely undiminished but nearly
absolute. It was a new era, time to devise new ways of seeing and dealing
with the world=97new strategies that would take full advantage of what they
saw as their unbridled supremacy.

The traditional paths to influence were waved off as the figments of
''old thinking.'' Multinational diplomacy was unnecessary; the United
States could go it alone. Fine if allies wanted to come along; even
better=97less constraining=97if they didn't. Nor were massive armies any
longer a prerequisite to dominance. New American-made technologies made
possible lightning victories on the battlefield with far fewer troops and
much lighter armaments. The mere demonstration of these weapons, of how
quickly they can crush an enemy's army and destroy its regime, would
compel other foes to change their ways and fall into our orbit or else
face the same doom. Other new technologies, it was believed, would soon
allow us to shoot down an enemy's nuclear missiles, ending the twentieth
century's most harrowing nightmare and nullifying the one grave threat
that hostile regimes might still pose.

These ideas had been developed and debated all through the 1990s by
foreign policy intellectuals, many of them former midlevel officials in
the Republican administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush.
Exiled to think tanks during the Democratic reign of Bill Clinton, they
were now ushered back to power by the election of Bush's son=97and eager to
translate their ideas into reality.

In the opening months of George W. Bush's presidency, they met the
resistance that new ideas usually spark from bureaucracies. Then came
September 11. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
weren't quite unprecedented in the annals of history, but they were new
to American soil, and top officials quickly agreed that they demanded a
new kind of response=97a new strategy for dealing not just with the
attackers but with the entire range of threats in the post=96Cold War
world.

These policy intellectuals=97some called themselves ''vulcans'' or
''neoconservatives''=97had a new strategy set to go. And nobody else did,
at least nobody so highly placed or committed. Their strategy, which
converged neatly with Bush's and his top officials' own predilections,
would serve as the framework for how to look at the world and what to do
next.

America would go to war against this new kind of foe; the intellectuals
had a strategy for a new kind of war. The old rostrums of stability,
deterrence, and containment were deemed irrelevant (after all, they
hadn't prevented 9/11); the new strategists called for regime change,
preemption, and victory. And their concept of victory was expansive, to
include not only defeating an enemy in battle or ''making the world safe
for democracy'' but=97in an ambitious twist on that age-old ideal=97remaking
the world into a democracy.

Yet this new strategy was not as new as it seemed. Pieces of it had been
around for decades, had been tried before, and had proved illusory. Some
of them, this time out, appeared to hold more promise. Technology had
improved; the political climate was more receptive. But the world hadn't
become so pliable. The laws of physics remained intact. Military and
political power still had their limits.

Bombs could now hit targets with uncanny precision, and armies could
maneuver across landscapes with impressive speed. But winning battles
didn't mean achieving the objectives of a war. Toppling a rogue regime
was one thing, and not always easy; but propping up a new government to
replace it was another thing entirely, and creating the conditions for
democracy was something else still.

There were some appealing ideas in the new strategy. But its
champions=97once in high office, keen to carve out new policies=97started to
tout and embrace the ideas as if they were elixirs, not merely useful
tools. They grew entranced by the new kinds of power=97the new kind of
world=97that these ideas might bring into being. The ideas morphed into a
vision, the vision into a dream. After September 11, they took their
dream into the real world=97acted it with open eyes=97and saw it dissolve
into a nightmare.

Excerpted with permission from John Wiley & Sons, Inc., from Daydream
Believers: How a Few Grand Ideas Wrecked American Power by Fred Kaplan.
Copyright =A9 2008 by Fred Kaplan.

--=20
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<DIV>
<DIV>
<DIV>
<DIV>
<DIV class=3Dslug>Excerpt: 'Daydream Believers'</DIV>
<P class=3Dbyline>by Fred Kaplan</P><!-- START TOP RESOURCE POSITION --><!-=
- START INSET COLUMN -->
<DIV class=3D"contentinset ciwide">
<DIV class=3D"dynamicbucket top">
<DIV class=3Dbuckettop>&nbsp;</DIV><!-- END CLASS=3D"BUCKETTOP" -->
<DIV class=3Dbucketcontent>
<DIV class=3Dphotowrapper><IMG class=3D"photo border" alt=3D"Daydream Belie=
vers" src=3D"http://media.npr.org/programs/fa/features/2008/02/daydreamcove=
r_200.jpg"><BR></DIV>
<DIV class=3Dspacer>&nbsp;</DIV></DIV><!-- END CLASS=3D"BUCKETCONTENT" -->
<DIV class=3Dbucketbottom>&nbsp;</DIV><!-- END CLASS=3D"BUCKETBOTTOM" --></=
DIV><!-- INCLUDE STATIC PLAYLIST INSET --></DIV><!-- END INSET COLUMN --><!=
-- START STORY CONTENT -->
<P><SPAN class=3Dprogram><A href=3D"http://www.npr.org/">NPR.org</A>,</SPAN=
> <SPAN class=3Ddate>February 5, 2008 =B7 </SPAN>Nearly all of America's bl=
unders in war and peace these past few years stem from a single grand misco=
nception: that the world changed after September 11, when in fact it didn't=
. </P>
<P>Certainly things about the world changed, not least Americans' sudden aw=
areness that they were vulnerable. But the way the world works=97the nature=
 of power, warfare, and politics among nations=97remained essentially the s=
ame. </P>
<P>A real change, a seismic shift in global politics, had taken place a dec=
ade earlier, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold =
War. Yet America's political leaders at the start of the twenty-first centu=
ry misunderstood this shift=97and in a way that their misreading of 9/11 wo=
uld exacerbate. </P>
<P>George W. Bush and his top aides in the White House and the Pentagon cam=
e to office believing that the United States had emerged from its Cold War =
victory as the world's ''sole superpower'' and that they could therefore do=
 pretty much as they pleased: issue orders and expect obeisance, topple rog=
ue regimes at will, honor alliances and treaties when they were useful, and=
 disregard them when they weren't. </P>
<P>But in fact, the end of the Cold War made America weaker, less capable o=
f exerting its will on others. And its leaders' failure to recognize this, =
their inclination to devise policies based on the premise of omnipotence, m=
ade America weaker still. </P>
<P>For all its rigidities and horrors, the Cold War was a system of interna=
tional order and security. Most nations fell into one of two camps: the Ame=
rican-led West or the Soviet-controlled East. In exchange for their loyalty=
 or submission, these countries received guarantees of protection. The coll=
apse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 meant the collapse of this syst=
em=97and the evaporation of the threat whose very existence had bolstered A=
merica's power and influence. </P>
<P>As long as there were two superpowers, the countries in between often fe=
lt compelled to pay fealty to their protector's interests, even when those =
interests collided with their own. Now, in a world with just one superpower=
, there was no fulcrum of pressure, no common looming enemy, to keep the bl=
oc in line. Many of America's allies remained allied, whether out of inerti=
a, shared values, shared interests, or a continuing desire for security. Bu=
t they were also free to go their own way, pursue their own interests, form=
 their own alliances of convenience, without much regard to Washington's th=
oughts about the matter. </P>
<P>There were two traditional courses a president might have taken to prese=
rve American influence in this geopolitical setting. One was to don the man=
tle of explicit empire: build up vast armies, deploy them worldwide, and no=
t hesitate to unleash them when necessary. But there was neither the money =
nor the manpower for a truly imperial army; nor did the American people hav=
e the stomach for prolonged engagement in brutal, distant wars. </P>
<P>The other course was to revitalize alliances, renovating the old ones, c=
ultivating new ones, forging as many links around as many issues and intere=
sts as possible. A president could have taken this course for purely pragma=
tic reasons. Powerful nations, especially powerful democracies, have always=
 needed allies, if not to get a job done, then to get it done with shared b=
urdens and legitimacy=97to get it done and keep it done. And in a world wit=
h no opposing superpower to cement its alliances by default, the United Sta=
tes would need allies more than ever and would have to work harder at diplo=
macy to lure=97and keep=97them on board. </P>
<P>Few in high office recognized this paradox of power. To President George=
 W. Bush and most of his aides (as well as the Republican-controlled Congre=
ss, many editorial-page writers, and a growing number of Democrats), Americ=
an power seemed not merely undiminished but nearly absolute. It was a new e=
ra, time to devise new ways of seeing and dealing with the world=97new stra=
tegies that would take full advantage of what they saw as their unbridled s=
upremacy. </P>
<P>The traditional paths to influence were waved off as the figments of ''o=
ld thinking.'' Multinational diplomacy was unnecessary; the United States c=
ould go it alone. Fine if allies wanted to come along; even better=97less c=
onstraining=97if they didn't. Nor were massive armies any longer a prerequi=
site to dominance. New American-made technologies made possible lightning v=
ictories on the battlefield with far fewer troops and much lighter armament=
s. The mere demonstration of these weapons, of how quickly they can crush a=
n enemy's army and destroy its regime, would compel other foes to change th=
eir ways and fall into our orbit or else face the same doom. Other new tech=
nologies, it was believed, would soon allow us to shoot down an enemy's nuc=
lear missiles, ending the twentieth century's most harrowing nightmare and =
nullifying the one grave threat that hostile regimes might still pose. </P>
<P>These ideas had been developed and debated all through the 1990s by fore=
ign policy intellectuals, many of them former midlevel officials in the Rep=
ublican administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush. Exiled to t=
hink tanks during the Democratic reign of Bill Clinton, they were now usher=
ed back to power by the election of Bush's son=97and eager to translate the=
ir ideas into reality.</P>
<P>In the opening months of George W. Bush's presidency, they met the resis=
tance that new ideas usually spark from bureaucracies. Then came September =
11. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon weren't quite un=
precedented in the annals of history, but they were new to American soil, a=
nd top officials quickly agreed that they demanded a new kind of response=
=97a new strategy for dealing not just with the attackers but with the enti=
re range of threats in the post=96Cold War world.</P>
<P>These policy intellectuals=97some called themselves ''vulcans'' or ''neo=
conservatives''=97had a new strategy set to go. And nobody else did, at lea=
st nobody so highly placed or committed. Their strategy, which converged ne=
atly with Bush's and his top officials' own predilections, would serve as t=
he framework for how to look at the world and what to do next. </P>
<P>America would go to war against this new kind of foe; the intellectuals =
had a strategy for a new kind of war. The old rostrums of stability, deterr=
ence, and containment were deemed irrelevant (after all, they hadn't preven=
ted 9/11); the new strategists called for regime change, preemption, and vi=
ctory. And their concept of victory was expansive, to include not only defe=
ating an enemy in battle or ''making the world safe for democracy'' but=97i=
n an ambitious twist on that age-old ideal=97remaking the world into a demo=
cracy. </P>
<P>Yet this new strategy was not as new as it seemed. Pieces of it had been=
 around for decades, had been tried before, and had proved illusory. Some o=
f them, this time out, appeared to hold more promise. Technology had improv=
ed; the political climate was more receptive. But the world hadn't become s=
o pliable. The laws of physics remained intact. Military and political powe=
r still had their limits. </P>
<P>Bombs could now hit targets with uncanny precision, and armies could man=
euver across landscapes with impressive speed. But winning battles didn't m=
ean achieving the objectives of a war. Toppling a rogue regime was one thin=
g, and not always easy; but propping up a new government to replace it was =
another thing entirely, and creating the conditions for democracy was somet=
hing else still.</P>
<P>There were some appealing ideas in the new strategy. But its champions=
=97once in high office, keen to carve out new policies=97started to tout an=
d embrace the ideas as if they were elixirs, not merely useful tools. They =
grew entranced by the new kinds of power=97the new kind of world=97that the=
se ideas might bring into being. The ideas morphed into a vision, the visio=
n into a dream. After September 11, they took their dream into the real wor=
ld=97acted it with open eyes=97and saw it dissolve into a nightmare.</P>
<P><STRONG>Excerpted with permission from John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc., from=
 <EM>Daydream Believers: How a Few Grand Ideas Wrecked American Power</EM> =
by Fred Kaplan. Copyright =A9 2008 by Fred Kaplan.</STRONG></P><!-- END STO=
RY CONTENT --><!-- STATIC PLAYLIST --><!-- START RELATED STORIES --><!-- EN=
D RELATED STORIES --></DIV></DIV></DIV></DIV><BR>

--=20
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