[Texgreen] Rumsfeld describes how to lose a war without admitting it

[Roger Baker]

... To limit the political fallout from shifting course he suggested =20
the administration consider a campaign to lower public expectations. =20
=93Announce that whatever new approach the U.S. decides on, the U.S. is =20=

doing so on a trial basis,=94 he wrote. =93This will give us the ability =
=20
to readjust and move to another course, if necessary, and therefore =20
not =91lose.=92 =94 =93Recast the U.S. military mission and the U.S. =
goals =20
(how we talk about them) =97 go minimalist,=94 he added...

                   =20
*******************************************************

<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/03/world/middleeast/03military.html?=20
_r=3D2&oref=3Dslogin&oref=3Dslogin>

Rumsfeld Memo Proposed =91Major Adjustment=92 in Iraq

By MICHAEL R. GORDON and DAVID S. CLOUD
Published: December 3, 2006
WASHINGTON, Dec. 2 =97 Two days before he resigned as defense =20
secretary, Donald H. Rumsfeld submitted a classified memo to the =20
White House that acknowledged that the Bush administration=92s strategy =20=

in Iraq was not working and called for a major course correction.

=93In my view it is time for a major adjustment,=94 wrote Mr. Rumsfeld, =20=

who has been a symbol of a dogged stay-the-course policy. =93Clearly, =20=

what U.S. forces are currently doing in Iraq is not working well =20
enough or fast enough.=94

Nor did Mr. Rumsfeld seem confident that the administration would =20
readily develop an effective alternative. To limit the political =20
fallout from shifting course he suggested the administration consider =20=

a campaign to lower public expectations.

=93Announce that whatever new approach the U.S. decides on, the U.S. is =20=

doing so on a trial basis,=94 he wrote. =93This will give us the ability =
=20
to readjust and move to another course, if necessary, and therefore =20
not =91lose.=92 =94

=93Recast the U.S. military mission and the U.S. goals (how we talk =20
about them) =97 go minimalist,=94 he added. Mr. Rumsfeld=92s memo =
suggests =20
frustration with the pace of turning over responsibility to the Iraqi =20=

authorities; in fact, the memo calls for examination of ideas that =20
roughly parallel troop withdrawal proposals presented by some of the =20
White House=92s sharpest Democratic critics. (Text of the Memo)

The memo=92s discussion of possible troop reduction options offers a =20
counterpoint to Mr. Rumsfeld=92s frequent public suggestions that =20
discussions about force levels are driven by requests from American =20
military commanders.

Instead, the memo puts on the table several ideas for troop =20
redeployments or withdrawals that appear to conflict with recent =20
public pronouncements from commanders in Iraq emphasizing the need to =20=

maintain troop levels.

The memorandum sometimes has a finger-wagging tone as Mr. Rumsfeld =20
says that the Iraqis must =93pull up their socks,=94 and suggests =20
reconstruction aid should be withheld in violent areas to avoid =20
rewarding =93bad behavior.=94

Other options called for shrinking the number of bases, establishing =20
benchmarks that would mark the Iraqis=92 progress toward political, =20
economic and security goals and conducting a =93reverse embeds=94 =
program =20
to attach Iraqi soldiers with American squads.

The memo was finished one day after President Bush interviewed Robert =20=

M. Gates, the president of Texas A&M University, as a potential =20
successor to Mr. Rumsfeld and one day before the midterm elections. =20
By then it was clear that the Republicans appeared likely to suffer a =20=

setback at the polls and that the administration was poised to begin =20
reconsidering its Iraq strategy.

By submitting the memo, Mr. Rumsfeld may have been trying to shape =20
the coming strategy discussion and present himself as open to change.

The memo provides no indication that Mr. Rumsfeld intended to leave =20
his Pentagon post. It is unclear whether he knew at that point that =20
he was about to be replaced, though the White House has said that Mr. =20=

Bush and Mr. Rumsfeld had a number of conversations on the matter.

Told that The New York Times had obtained a copy of it, a Pentagon =20
spokesman confirmed its authenticity. =93As it became clear that people =20=

were considering options for the way forward, the secretary had some =20
views on the subject, and this memo reflects those views,=94 said the =20=

spokesman, Eric Ruff.

At the Pentagon, Mr. Rumsfeld has been famous for his =93snowflakes=94 =97=
 =20
memos that drift down to the bureaucracy from on high and that are =20
used to ask questions, stimulate debate and shape policy. Mr. =20
Rumsfeld=92s Nov. 6 memorandum, circulated as part of the =20
administration=92s review of Iraq policy, is written in that spirit and =20=

with the same blunt aphorisms that Mr. Rumsfeld frequently uses in =20
public.

Unlike the lawyerly memo on Iraq policy submitted last month by =20
Stephen J. Hadley, the national security adviser, Mr. Rumsfeld=92s =20
listed more than a dozen =93illustrative options=94 that the defense =20
secretary did not specifically endorse but suggested merited serious =20
consideration. =93Many of these options could, and in a number of =20
cases, should be done in combination with others,=94 Mr. Rumsfeld =
advised.

With Mr. Rumsfeld=92s resignation, the options no longer have the same =20=

weight. In recent weeks, some have been discarded as the Bush =20
administration tries to adjust its military and political strategy in =20=

Iraq. But others, like increasing the number of advisers attached to =20
Iraqi forces, live on and have also been recommended by others.

Mr. Rumsfeld, who has presided over two wars and is one of the =20
longest-serving Pentagon chiefs, is scheduled to leave when his =20
designated successor, Mr. Gates, is confirmed by the Senate, expected =20=

later this month.

Titled =93Iraq =97 Illustrative New Courses of Action,=94 the memo =
reflects =20
mounting concern over a war that, as Mr. Rumsfeld put it, has evolved =20=

from =93major combat operations to counterterrorism, to =20
counterinsurgency, to dealing with death squads and sectarian violence.=94=


The first section of the memo contains two pages of options that Mr. =20
Rumsfeld describes as =93above the line=94 ideas worthy of =
consideration. =20
Some that Mr. Rumsfeld found intriguing appear to reflect his long-=20
held view that the United States should use relatively modest force =20
in intervening in foreign countries to avoid creating a dependency on =20=

American power. That approach, critics have charged, left the United =20
States unprepared to deal with the chaos that followed the ouster of =20
Saddam Hussein.

Mr. Rumsfeld has frequently emphasized the difficulty of stabilizing =20
Iraq and the need to turn over responsibility to Iraqi authorities as =20=

quickly as possible. But he has also been a forceful, even =20
cantankerous, defender of American policy, often insisting his =20
critics were unduly pessimistic.

On Oct. 31, just a week before finishing the memo, Mr. Rumsfeld told =20
a radio interviewer, =93I feel that we are making good progress with =20
the piece of it the Defense Department has.=94

One option Mr. Rumsfeld offered calls for modest troop withdrawals =20
=93so Iraqis know they have to pull up their socks, step up and take =20
responsibility for their country.=94

Another option calls for redeploying American troops from =93vulnerable =20=

positions=94 in Baghdad and other cities to safer areas in Iraq or =20
Kuwait, where they would act as a =93quick reaction force.=94 That idea =20=

is similar to a plan suggested by Representative John P. Murtha, a =20
Pennsylvania Democrat, a plan that the White House has soundly rebuffed.

Still another option calls for consolidating the number of American =20
bases in Iraq to 5 from 55 by July 2007, a considerable shrinking of =20
the American footprint. At the same time, Mr. Rumsfeld all but =20
dismisses the idea of setting a firm date for removing American =20
forces from Iraq, listing it as one of the less palatable ideas.

One of the more provocative options would punish provinces that =20
failed to cooperate with the Americans by withdrawing economic =20
assistance and security. =93Stop rewarding bad behavior, as was done in =20=

Falluja when they pushed in reconstruction funds, and start rewarding =20=

good behavior,=94 the option reads. =93No more reconstruction assistance =
=20
in areas where there is violence.=94

Some military officers have said that the idea of denying assistance =20
in some areas ignores the fact that many Iraqis are afraid to =20
cooperate with the Americans for fear of retaliation by insurgents.

Falluja has been the focus of reconstruction efforts following an =20
offensive by Americans that crippled city services and damaged scores =20=

of buildings, leaving the United States few options beyond rebuilding =20=

or evacuating the city. Now, it is considered by the Marines to be =20
one of the few relatively stable areas in the dangerous Anbar =20
Province. Many of the other towns in the region have become even more =20=

hostile because the economic assistance has been minimal, leaving the =20=

residents feeling neglected by the authorities in Baghdad, military =20
officers say.

Then, too, work on infrastructure that sprawls across the country, =20
like the electrical grid and the oil pipeline network, cannot be =20
limited to nonviolent areas.

=93There is an element of throwing in the towel and effectively giving =20=

up on at least some areas of the country,=94 said James Dobbins, a =20
former State Department official and director of the International =20
Security and Defense Policy Center at RAND.

In any case, administration officials indicated this week that =20
withholding assistance was not under serious consideration.

Reflecting exasperation with much of the American government, another =20=

option in Mr. Rumsfeld=92s memo raises the possibility of using =20
military reservists to =93beef up=94 the Iraqi government=92s =
ministries. =20
=93Give up on trying to get other USG Departments to do it,=94 he =
writes, =20
referring to other United States government agencies.

Taking a leaf out of Mr. Hussein=92s book, Mr. Rumsfeld seemed to see =20=

some merit in the former dictator=92s practice of paying Iraqi leaders. =20=

=93Provide money to key political and religious leaders (as Saddam =20
Hussein did), to get them to help us get through this difficult =20
period,=94 one option reads.

The list of favored options notably does not mention the =93clear, hold =20=

and build=94 approach that the White House has touted as its strategy =20=

for waging counterinsurgency. That is a troop-intensive approach that =20=

calls for clearing contested areas with American and Iraqi troops, =20
holding them with American and Iraqi forces and then carrying out =20
reconstruction programs to win popular support. Nor does the list =20
make the withdrawal of American forces explicitly contingent on =20
improving conditions in Iraq.

The final page of the memo is a brief list of six =93less attractive=94 =20=

options, which Mr. Rumsfeld describes as =93below the line.=94 These =20
include an =93aggressive federalism plan,=94 an international conference =
=20
modeled on the Dayton accords that produced an agreement on Bosnia =20
and an idea that is currently being seriously discussed by senior =20
administration officials: temporarily sending 20,000 additional =20
American forces or more to Baghdad to try to improve security in the =20
Iraqi capital and regain momentum.

Moving a large fraction of American forces to Baghdad to =93attempt to =20=

control it,=94 Mr. Rumsfeld writes without further elaboration, would =20=

be =93below the line.=94=