[Texgreen] Mideast allies near a state of panic

[Roger Baker]

  <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-=20
usmideast3dec03,0,7181716.story?coll=3Dla-home-headlines>

Mideast allies near a state of panic

U.S. leaders' visits to the region reap only warnings and worry.
By Paul Richter, Times Staff Writer
December 3, 2006


WASHINGTON =97 President Bush and his top advisors fanned out across =20
the troubled Middle East over the last week to showcase their =20
diplomatic initiatives to restore strained relationships with =20
traditional allies and forge new ones with leaders in Iraq.

But instead of flaunting stronger ties and steadfast American =20
influence, the president's journey found friends both old and new =20
near a state of panic. Mideast leaders expressed soaring concern over =20=

upheavals across the region that the United States helped ignite =20
through its invasion of Iraq and push for democracy =97 and fear that =20=

the Bush administration may make things worse.

President Bush's summit in Jordan with the Iraqi prime minister =20
proved an awkward encounter that deepened doubts about the =20
relationship. Vice President Dick Cheney's stop in Riyadh, the Saudi =20
capital, yielded a blunt warning from the kingdom's leaders. And =20
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's swing through the West Bank and =20=

Israel, intended to build Arab support by showing a new U.S. push for =20=

peace, found little to work with.

In all, visits designed to show the American team in charge ended =20
instead in diplomatic embarrassment and disappointment, with U.S. =20
leaders rebuked and lectured by Arab counterparts. The trips =20
demonstrated that U.S. allies in the region were struggling to =20
understand what to make of the difficult relationship, and to figure =20
whether, with a new Democratic majority taking over Congress, Bush =20
even had control over his nation's Mideast policy.

Arabs are "trying to figure out what the Americans are going to do, =20
and trying develop their own plans," said Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.), =20
one of his party's point men on Iraq. "They're trying to figure out =20
their Plan B."

The allies' predicament was described by Jordan's King Abdullah II =20
last week, before Bush arrived in Amman, the capital. Abdullah, one =20
of America's steadiest friends in the region, warned that the Mideast =20=

faced the threat of three simultaneous civil wars =97 in Iraq, Lebanon =20=

and the Palestinian territories. And he made clear that the burden of =20=

dealing with it rested largely with the United States.

"Something dramatic" needed to come out of Bush's meetings with Iraqi =20=

Prime Minister Nouri Maliki to defuse the three-way threat, Abdullah =20
said, because "I don't think we're in a position where we can come =20
back and visit the problem in early 2007."

The only regional leader to voice unqualified support for the Bush =20
administration has been Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who has =20
gone so far as to say that the Iraq invasion contributed to regional =20
stability.

To Middle East observers, Bush can no longer speak for the United =20
States as he did before because of the domestic pressure for a change =20=

of course in Iraq, said Nathan Brown, a specialist on Arab politics =20
at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

"He can talk all he wants about 'staying until the job is done,' but =20
these leaders can read about the American political scene and see =20
that he may not be able to deliver that," Brown said.

The Bush-Maliki meeting Thursday, closely watched around the world in =20=

anticipation of a possible change in U.S. strategy, produced no shift =20=

in declared aims. Rather, it resulted in diplomatic stumbles that =20
seemed to belie the leaders' claims that their relationship was intact.

On the eve of the summit, a leaked memo written by Bush's national =20
security advisor, Stephen Hadley, showed that U.S. officials =20
questioned Maliki's abilities. But the memo also was a reminder of =20
dwindling U.S. influence over Iraq. Some of the steps that Hadley =20
said the Iraqis should take, such as providing public services to =20
Sunni Arabs as well as Shiites, were moves that the Americans had =20
demanded for many months, without success.

The leak of the memo cast a shadow over the summit, and Maliki =20
abruptly canceled the first scheduled meeting, a conversation among =20
Bush, Maliki and Abdullah. White House aides insisted that the =20
cancellation was not a snub.

One Middle East diplomat said later in an interview that Maliki had =20
canceled the meeting to put distance between him and Bush at a time =20
when Iraq's Shiite lawmakers and Cabinet ministers with ties to =20
militant cleric Muqtada Sadr had halted their participation in the =20
government to protest the summit.

On Saturday, in his regular radio address, Bush said that his =20
relationship with Maliki was, in fact, improving.

"With each meeting, I'm coming to know him better, and I'm becoming =20
more impressed by his desire to make the difficult choices that will =20
put his country on a better path," Bush said.

During the trip, Bush was unable to distance himself from the fierce =20
debate about Iraq policy back home. The president felt the need to =20
respond to news accounts saying that an advisory panel on Iraq would =20
urge a gradual withdrawal of combat troops from the region. He =20
insisted that suggestions for such a "graceful exit" were not realistic.

Despite this, Bush repeated in his radio address that he intended to =20
look for a bipartisan solution to the war, and would listen to the =20
recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, which is scheduled to =20
present its findings Wednesday.

He also said that his own internal review, coming from Pentagon and =20
White House officials, among others, was near completion, suggesting =20
that he may be discussing the options before him over the next =20
several days.

"I want to hear all advice before I make any decisions about =20
adjustments to our strategy in Iraq," Bush said.

Cheney's trip to talk to Saudi King Abdullah was far less visible =20
than Bush's mission, but helped to make painfully clear the gap =20
between U.S. goals and those of its Arab allies.

U.S. officials said Cheney initiated the trip. But foreign diplomats =20
said that Saudi leaders sought the visit to express their concern =20
about the region, including fears of a U.S. departure and what they =20
see as excessive American support for the Shiite faction in Iraq.

After the meeting with Cheney, Saudi officials released an unusual =20
statement pointedly highlighting American responsibility for =20
deterioration of stability in the region.

The Saudi officials cited "the direct influence of =85 the United =20
States on the issues of the region" and said it was important for =20
U.S. influence "to be in accord with the region's actual condition =20
and its historical equilibrium," an apparent reference to the Sunni-=20
Shiite balance.

The Saudi statement also said the U.S. in the Middle East should =20
"pursue equitable means that contribute to ending its conflicts," =20
pointing to the Israeli-Palestinian situation.

The statement "came pretty close to a rebuke, by Saudi standards," =20
said Charles W. Freeman Jr., a former U.S. ambassador to Saudi =20
Arabia. "It said, in effect, that the United States needs to behave =20
responsibly."

There have been other signals of Saudi anxiety recently.

On Wednesday, an advisor to the Saudi government wrote in the =20
Washington Post that if the United States pulled out of Iraq, =20
"massive Saudi intervention" would ensue to protect Sunnis from =20
Shiite militias.

The Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Turki al Faisal, =20
warned in a speech in October against an American withdrawal, saying =20
that "since the United States came into Iraq uninvited, it should not =20=

leave Iraq uninvited."

Rice encountered the limits of U.S. influence when she visited =20
Jerusalem and the West Bank town of Jericho last week, trying to =20
entice Arab confidence by displaying a renewed interest in Israeli-=20
Palestinian peace.

But Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas was gloomy about =20
the prospects for a deal between his Fatah party and the militant =20
group Hamas that would allow formation of a nonsectarian government =20
and open the way for increased aid and, potentially, peace talks with =20=

Israel.

Rice said afterward that the administration "cannot create the =20
circumstances" for peace.

"This is the kind of thing that takes time," she said. "You don't =20
expect great leaps forward."

Expressing deeper unhappiness with the United States, leaders from =20
Jordan, Egypt and Persian Gulf countries told Rice during her trip to =20=

an economic development conference in Jordan on Friday that the U.S. =20
had a responsibility to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which =20=

they and many analysts viewed as the key to regional stability.

Amr Moussa, secretary-general of the Arab League, urged greater U.S. =20
action, warning that the Middle East was becoming "an abyss=85. The =20
region is facing real failure."


paul.richter@latimes.com

Times staff writers Doyle McManus and Peter Wallsten contributed to =20
this report.