[Texgreen] The best way out

[Roger Baker]

"... What Bush has to do now is to launch an all-out effort to =20
shepherd Iraq's disparate factions and communities into a political =20
compact while seeking the neighbors' cooperation in preventing Iraq =20
from becoming the anarchic failed state that would suit Al Qaeda's =20
strategic aims. At the same time, all the concerned parties have to =20
be told that US troops will be leaving soon, that America has no need =20=

for permanent military bases in Iraq and no designs for colonialist =20
domination of Iraqis."

[And also lets hope that all our Arab friends agree to let bygones be =20=

bygones, and don't try to raise the price of oil on us or do deals =20
with China just because of this unfortunate situation involving Iraq. =20=

-- R]

                   ***********************************

<http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/editorials/=20
articles/2006/11/19/lost_illusions_in_iraq/?p1=3DMEWell_Pos3>

GLOBE EDITORIAL
Lost illusions in Iraq
November 19, 2006

PRESIDENT BUSH and his advisers led America into a calamitous impasse =20=

in Iraq thanks to their penchant for comforting illusions and their =20
unwillingness to face reality. Now that voters have made it plain the =20=

country has lost patience with a war that has lasted longer than =20
World War II, it is time to forge an exit strategy. There is no more =20
time for illusions.

Once, it might have been possible to help Iraqis create a stable, =20
democratic state to replace the genocidal despotism of Saddam =20
Hussein. But the Bush administration's disregard of historical and =20
political conditions in Iraq, coupled with a fatal refusal to heed =20
advice from people who knew the country well, has left policy makers =20
today with a narrow range of choices. At best, they can settle for a =20
way of ending the war that accepts a painful outcome so that the =20
worst can be avoided.

To see the situation clearly, Bush and his team must recognize the =20
stark truth about the sectarian killings and the violent expulsions =20
of Shi'ites and Sunni Arabs from their homes. The horrors let loose =20
in Iraq today go beyond the binary violence between Sunni and Shi'ite =20=

Arabs. In the predominantly Shi'ite south of the country, rival =20
militias conduct their own version of gang warfare. In the Sunni Arab =20=

areas of western Iraq, there is mushrooming mayhem among foreign =20
jihadists, local insurgents, criminal bands, and tribal fighters.

The sooner Bush abandons the illusion that US troops can stop this =20
many-sided internecine warfare in the Arab sectors of Iraq, the =20
sooner he will accept the futility of prolonging a mission that can =20
no longer be achieved.

It is probably true that the sectarian massacres will get worse after =20=

the departure of US and British troops -- at least for awhile. But =20
there was an increase in sectarian slaughters when US forces largely =20
withdrew from Baghdad earlier in the war, and yet another increase =20
when US troops returned. The Americans are hardly protecting the =20
communities of Baghdad now from the mad bombers and death squads =20
rampaging across the capital. And chances are there will be at least =20
a temporary upsurge in the bloodletting whenever the foreign forces =20
depart, be it sooner or later.

Because the resistance against foreign occupation has largely been =20
transformed into a sectarian vendetta that hides a struggle for =20
power, there is little chance that an increase in US troop levels or =20
more aggressive tactics could defeat the insurgents or even produce a =20=

tolerable level of security.

It is no less an illusion to believe the departure of foreign forces =20
will have a pacifying effect on Iraqis. Since Sunni fighters and =20
Shi'ite death squads are battling each other more than the Americans =20
and British, withdrawal of the outsiders will not likely deprive the =20
warring factions of a reason to go on fighting.

A particularly disheartening reality that US military commanders are =20
in the process of analyzing is the failure of Iraqi security forces =20
to impose a modicum of law and order. There are at present more than =20
300,000 Iraqi soldiers and police, mostly trained by American =20
instructors. There have been some encouraging exceptions, but too =20
often Iraqi soldiers are reluctant to fight outside their own regions =20=

or against groups within their own communities. And too many police =20
units have been infiltrated by Shi'ite militias that kidnap, torture, =20=

and murder Sunnis at random.

In whatever time is left to the US Army in Iraq, it is worth the =20
effort to improve the training and performance of Iraqi soldiers and =20
police. After coalition forces withdraw, those Iraqis will become the =20=

last line of domestic defense against a full-blown civil war and the =20
establishment of a safe haven in western Iraq for Al Qaeda and like-=20
minded terrorist outfits. Still, the ominous reality is that the =20
ranks of the Iraqi police, and to a lesser extent the army, are =20
suffused with sectarianism. It is not merely the democratic project =20
in Iraq that now appears precarious; the basic principle of Iraqihood =20=

is not taking hold.

Former Secretary of State James Baker has let it be known that the =20
bipartisan Iraq Study Group he heads with former Democratic House =20
member Lee Hamilton will recommend talking to Iraq's neighbors about =20
a deal to foster stability in Iraq after a US withdrawal. It was =20
always an illusion that the Americans could establish a new order in =20
Iraq without some cooperation from other states in the region. And =20
now, sensing that a US withdrawal from Iraq is in the cards, Iran and =20=

Syria have given signs that they are anxious about what may become of =20=

Iraq after the American troops have redeployed "over the horizon."

In their different ways, the regimes in Tehran and Damascus are nasty =20=

customers and difficult negotiating partners. They will demand a high =20=

price for helping to tamp down Iraq's sectarian violence and stop =20
jihadists from flocking to Iraq. To his credit, Baker has already =20
begun talking to Iranian and Syrian officials. If regional =20
cooperation on Iraq is to be effective, however, it will also have to =20=

include the Saudis, Kuwaitis, Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey. All must be =20
involved not only because they could otherwise be spoilers, but =20
because they are all threatened by the specter of Shi'ite-Sunni =20
warfare that could draw in Iraq's neighbors and spill across borders.

Bush has played the part of sorcerer's apprentice in Iraq. Now the =20
time has come to repair the damage he has done. Precise dates for =20
redeployment and withdrawal need not be fixed immediately. Announcing =20=

a timetable would not persuade the Iraqi government to take steps it =20
is incapable of taking. What Bush has to do now is to launch an all-=20
out effort to shepherd Iraq's disparate factions and communities into =20=

a political compact while seeking the neighbors' cooperation in =20
preventing Iraq from becoming the anarchic failed state that would =20
suit Al Qaeda's strategic aims. At the same time, all the concerned =20
parties have to be told that US troops will be leaving soon, that =20
America has no need for permanent military bases in Iraq and no =20
designs for colonialist domination of Iraqis.

=A9 Copyright 2006 Globe Newspaper Company.