[Texgreen] Rome's 9/11?
Sean Hale
seanhale@sbcglobal.net
Thu, 05 Oct 2006 07:38:59 -0500
September 30, 2006
Op-Ed Contributor
New York Times
Pirates of the Mediterranean
By ROBERT HARRIS
Kintbury, England
IN the autumn of 68 B.C. the world=92s only military superpower was dealt a=
=20
profound psychological blow by a daring terrorist attack on its very heart.=
=20
Rome=92s port at Ostia was set on fire, the consular war fleet destroyed,=
and=20
two prominent senators, together with their bodyguards and staff, kidnapped.
The incident, dramatic though it was, has not attracted much attention from=
=20
modern historians. But history is mutable. An event that was merely a=20
footnote five years ago has now, in our post-9/11 world, assumed a fresh=20
and ominous significance. For in the panicky aftermath of the attack, the=20
Roman people made decisions that set them on the path to the destruction of=
=20
their Constitution, their democracy and their liberty. One cannot help=20
wondering if history is repeating itself.
Consider the parallels. The perpetrators of this spectacular assault were=20
not in the pay of any foreign power: no nation would have dared to attack=20
Rome so provocatively. They were, rather, the disaffected of the earth:=20
=93The ruined men of all nations,=94 in the words of the great 19th-century=
=20
German historian Theodor Mommsen, =93a piratical state with a peculiar=
esprit=20
de corps.=94
Like Al Qaeda, these pirates were loosely organized, but able to spread a=20
disproportionate amount of fear among citizens who had believed themselves=
=20
immune from attack. To quote Mommsen again: =93The Latin husbandman, the=20
traveler on the Appian highway, the genteel bathing visitor at the=20
terrestrial paradise of Baiae were no longer secure of their property or=20
their life for a single moment.=94
What was to be done? Over the preceding centuries, the Constitution of=20
ancient Rome had developed an intricate series of checks and balances=20
intended to prevent the concentration of power in the hands of a single=20
individual. The consulship, elected annually, was jointly held by two men.=
=20
Military commands were of limited duration and subject to regular renewal.=
=20
Ordinary citizens were accustomed to a remarkable degree of liberty: the=20
cry of =93Civis Romanus sum=94 =97 =93I am a Roman citizen=94 =97 was a=
guarantee of=20
safety throughout the world.
But such was the panic that ensued after Ostia that the people were willing=
=20
to compromise these rights. The greatest soldier in Rome, the 38-year-old=20
Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (better known to posterity as Pompey the Great)=20
arranged for a lieutenant of his, the tribune Aulus Gabinius, to rise in=20
the Roman Forum and propose an astonishing new law.
=93Pompey was to be given not only the supreme naval command but what=20
amounted in fact to an absolute authority and uncontrolled power over=20
everyone,=94 the Greek historian Plutarch wrote. =93There were not many=
places=20
in the Roman world that were not included within these limits.=94
Pompey eventually received almost the entire contents of the Roman Treasury=
=20
=97 144 million sesterces =97 to pay for his =93war on terror,=94 which=
included=20
building a fleet of 500 ships and raising an army of 120,000 infantry and=20
5,000 cavalry. Such an accumulation of power was unprecedented, and there=20
was literally a riot in the Senate when the bill was debated.
Nevertheless, at a tumultuous mass meeting in the center of Rome, Pompey=92s=
=20
opponents were cowed into submission, the Lex Gabinia passed (illegally),=20
and he was given his power. In the end, once he put to sea, it took less=20
than three months to sweep the pirates from the entire Mediterranean. Even=
=20
allowing for Pompey=92s genius as a military strategist, the suspicion=
arises=20
that if the pirates could be defeated so swiftly, they could hardly have=20
been such a grievous threat in the first place.
But it was too late to raise such questions. By the oldest trick in the=20
political book =97 the whipping up of a panic, in which any dissenting voice=
=20
could be dismissed as =93soft=94 or even =93traitorous=94 =97 powers had=
been ceded=20
by the people that would never be returned. Pompey stayed in the Middle=20
East for six years, establishing puppet regimes throughout the region, and=
=20
turning himself into the richest man in the empire.
Those of us who are not Americans can only look on in wonder at the similar=
=20
ease with which the ancient rights and liberties of the individual are=20
being surrendered in the United States in the wake of 9/11. The vote by the=
=20
Senate on Thursday to suspend the right of habeas corpus for terrorism=20
detainees, denying them their right to challenge their detention in court;=
=20
the careful wording about torture, which forbids only the inducement of=20
=93serious=94 physical and mental suffering to obtain information; the=20
admissibility of evidence obtained in the United States without a search=20
warrant; the licensing of the president to declare a legal resident of the=
=20
United States an enemy combatant =97 all this represents an historic shift=
in=20
the balance of power between the citizen and the executive.
An intelligent, skeptical American would no doubt scoff at the thought that=
=20
what has happened since 9/11 could presage the destruction of a=20
centuries-old constitution; but then, I suppose, an intelligent, skeptical=
=20
Roman in 68 B.C. might well have done the same.
In truth, however, the Lex Gabinia was the beginning of the end of the=20
Roman republic. It set a precedent. Less than a decade later, Julius Caesar=
=20
=97 the only man, according to Plutarch, who spoke out in favor of Pompey=92=
s=20
special command during the Senate debate =97 was awarded similar, extended=
=20
military sovereignty in Gaul. Previously, the state, through the Senate,=20
largely had direction of its armed forces; now the armed forces began to=20
assume direction of the state.
It also brought a flood of money into an electoral system that had been=20
designed for a simpler, non-imperial era. Caesar, like Pompey, with all the=
=20
resources of Gaul at his disposal, became immensely wealthy, and used his=20
treasure to fund his own political faction. Henceforth, the result of=20
elections was determined largely by which candidate had the most money to=20
bribe the electorate. In 49 B.C., the system collapsed completely, Caesar=20
crossed the Rubicon =97 and the rest, as they say, is ancient history.
It may be that the Roman republic was doomed in any case. But the=20
disproportionate reaction to the raid on Ostia unquestionably hastened the=
=20
process, weakening the restraints on military adventurism and corrupting=20
the political process. It was to be more than 1,800 years before anything=20
remotely comparable to Rome=92s democracy =97 imperfect though it was =97=
rose again.
The Lex Gabinia was a classic illustration of the law of unintended=20
consequences: it fatally subverted the institution it was supposed to=20
protect. Let us hope that vote in the United States Senate does not have=20
the same result.
Robert Harris is the author, most recently, of =93Imperium: A Novel of=20
Ancient Rome.=94
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/30/opinion/30harris.html
***************
History teaches that war begins when governments believe the price of=20
aggression is cheap. -- Ronald Reagan