[Texgreen] Our puppet government won't behave

[Roger Baker]

[Bush purged his last generals like Abizaid for not winning the war =20
in Iraq. Maybe its time to purge the ones he just appointed and then =20
keep right on purging until he finds some generals who know how make =20
the Iraqis behave enough to win this darn war. -- Roger]



<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/15/world/middleeast/15baghdad.html?=20
hp&ex=3D1168837200&en=3D4666f60671e0a842&ei=3D5094&partner=3Dhomepage>

U.S. and Iraqis Are Wrangling Over War Plans

By JOHN F. BURNS
Published: January 15, 2007

BAGHDAD, Jan. 14 =97 Just days after President Bush unveiled a new war =20=

plan calling for more than 20,000 additional American troops in Iraq, =20=

the heart of the effort =97 a major push to secure the capital =97 faces =
=20
some of its fiercest resistance from the very people it depends on =20
for success: Iraqi government officials.

American military officials have spent days huddled in meetings with =20
Iraqi officers in a race to turn blueprints drawn up in Washington =20
into a plan that will work on the ground in Baghdad. With the first =20
American and Iraqi units dedicated to the plan due to be in place =20
within weeks, time is short for setting details of what American =20
officers view as the decisive battle of the war.

But the signs so far have unnerved some Americans working on the =20
plan, who have described a web of problems =97 ranging from a contested =20=

chain of command to how to protect American troops deployed in some =20
of Baghdad=92s most dangerous districts =97 that some fear could hobble =20=

the effort before it begins.

First among the American concerns is a Shiite-led government that has =20=

been so dogmatic in its attitude that the Americans worry that they =20
will be frustrated in their aim of cracking down equally on Shiite =20
and Sunni extremists, a strategy President Bush has declared central =20
to the plan.

=93We are implementing a strategy to embolden a government that is =20
actually part of the problem,=94 said an American military official in =20=

Baghdad involved in talks over the plan. =93We are being played like a =20=

pawn.=94

The American military=92s misgivings came as new details emerged of the =20=

reconstruction portion of Mr. Bush=92s plan, which calls for more than =20=

doubling the number of American-led reconstruction teams in Iraq to =20
22 and quintupling the number of American civilian reconstruction =20
specialists to 500. [Page A7.]

Compounding American doubts about the government=92s willingness to go =20=

after Shiite extremists has been a behind-the-scenes struggle over =20
the appointment of the Iraqi officer to fill the key post of =20
operational commander for the Baghdad operation. In face of strong =20
American skepticism, the Iraqi prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, =20
has selected an officer from the Shiite heartland of southern Iraq =20
who was virtually unknown to the Americans, and whose hard-edged =20
demands for Iraqi primacy in the effort has deepened American anxieties.

The Iraqi commander, Lt. Gen. Aboud Qanbar, will be part of what the =20
Americans have described as a partnership between the two armies, =20
with an American general, Maj. Gen. Joseph F. Fil Jr., commander of =20
the First Cavalry Division, working with General Aboud, and American =20
and Iraqi officers twinned down the operational chain.

For the Americans, accustomed to clear operational control, the =20
partnership concept is troublesome =97 full of potential, some officers =20=

fear, for dispute with the Iraqis over tough issues like applying an =20
equal hand against Shiite and Sunni gunmen.

It remains unclear whether the prime minister will be in overall =20
charge of the new crackdown, a demand the Iraqis have pressed since =20
the plan was first discussed last month, American officials said. =20
They said days of argument had led to a compromise under which =20
General Qanbar would answer to a so-called crisis counsel, made up of =20=

Mr. Maliki, the ministers of defense and interior, Iraqi national =20
security adviser, Mowaffak al-Rubaie, and the top American military =20
commander in Iraq.

The Americans said that while they had reluctantly accepted General =20
Qanbar, they had won concessions from the Iraqis in the appointment =20
of two officers favored by the American command for the two deputy =20
Iraqi commanders, one for the areas of Baghdad west of the Tigris =20
River, the other for districts to the east.

Still, the new command structure seemed rife with potential for =20
conflict. An American military official said that the arrangements =20
appeared unwieldy, and at odds with military doctrine calling for a =20
clear chain of command. =93There=92s no military definition for =20
=91partnered,=92 =94 he said.

Along with those problems, the Americans cite logistical issues that =20
must be solved before the new plan can begin to work. Intent on using =20=

the large numbers of additional American and Iraqi troops that have =20
been pledged to the plan to get =93boots on the ground=94 across =
Baghdad, =20
they are planning to establish perhaps 30 or 40 =93joint security =20
sites=94 spread across nine new military districts in the capital, many =20=

in police stations that have been among the most frequent targets in =20
the war.

But in many areas, there are no police stations, at least none =20
suitable as operational centers, so the planners are seeking =20
alternate locations, including large houses, that will have to be =20
fortified with 15-foot-high concrete blast walls, rolls of barbed =20
wire and machine-gun towers.

There are no solutions yet to longstanding problems like who =97 the =20
American forces, or the Iraqis=92 own anemic logistics system =97 will =20=

supply the fuel required to keep Iraqi Humvees and troop-carrying =20
trucks running, at a time when the American supply chain will face =20
new strains in supporting thousands of additional American troops.

The plan gives a central role to the National Police, viewed as =20
widely infiltrated by Shiite militias and, despite an intensive =20
American retraining program, still suspected of a strongly Shiite =20
sectarian bias. One American officer said that the National Police =20
commanders have been =93dragging their feet=94 over their role in the =
new =20
plan and that they could seriously compromise the operation.

Against those concerns, American officers cite several factors they =20
believe will lend impetus to the new offensive. The five additional =20
brigades of American troops committed by President Bush =97 =20
approximately 21,500 American soldiers, about 80 percent of them to =20
be deployed in Baghdad =97 will roughly triple the numbers of American =20=

soldiers available for ground operations, as a relatively small =20
proportion of the new troop strength will be needed for =93force =20
protection,=94 the military term for troops who safeguard bases and =20
ensure the safety of other soldiers.

Since the resignation of former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld =20
after the November elections, American commanders here have been more =20=

candid in acknowledging something Mr. Rumsfeld often disputed: that =20
the commanders have had to play shell games with thinly stretched =20
troops, and that many crucial operations, including previous attempts =20=

to secure Baghdad, have failed because troops have often been moved =20
on to other operations, allowing insurgents and militia groups to =20
retake areas vacated by the Americans. The new plan, the Americans =20
say, will go a long way toward redressing that problem, at least in =20
Baghdad.

Another positive cited by American officers is the appointment by =20
President Bush of Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus as the new overall =20
American commander in Iraq, succeeding Gen. George W. Casey Jr., who =20
will leave next month after more 30 months in command of the war. =20
General Petraeus, who has already completed two 12-month tours in =20
Iraq, has a reputation among officers who have served under him as an =20=

imaginative commander who enlists strong loyalties among his troops.

Many officers interviewed for this article said they still believed =20
the tide of the war here can be reversed, with the additional troops, =20=

the focus on regaining control of Baghdad and the more consistent =20
military strategy they said they expected from General Petraeus. The =20
54-year-old native of upstate New York, a marathon runner, will come =20
to Baghdad after overseeing the Army=92s reworking of its =20
counterinsurgency manual, parts of which he redrafted himself.

American officials in Baghdad and Washington have said that they have =20=

limited time =97 perhaps no more than six to nine months =97 to show =20
gains from the new American push before popular support erodes still =20
further and the onset of the 2008 presidential campaign leads =20
American politicians to push harder for a troop withdrawal. There are =20=

also questions of how long the overstretched American military can =20
sustain the stepped-up presence here.

Together, those factors have thrust American military planners into =20
the equivalent of a two-minute drill, trying to develop a plan that =20
will yield rapid gains in regaining control of Baghdad neighborhoods =20
that have slipped into near-anarchy as Sunni insurgents and Shiite =20
death squads have run rampant. While American officers are confident =20
the additional troops will make a major impact, they worry about what =20=

will happen when the American troop commitment is scaled down again, =20
and Iraqi troops are left facing the main burden of patrolling the city.

That prospect raises the specter of repeating what has happened on =20
several other occasions in Baghdad: Americans clearing neighborhoods =20
house-by-house, only for insurgents and militiamen to reappear when =20
Iraqi security forces take over from the Americans and prove =20
incapable of holding the ground, or compliant with the marauding =20
gunmen. That was the pattern with Operation Together Forward, the =20
last effort to secure Baghdad, which began with an additional 7,000 =20
American troops over the summer, and effectively abandoned within two =20=

months when Iraqi troops failed to hold areas the Americans handed =20
over to them.

Another concern is that the target of the new Baghdad plan =97 Sunni =20
and Shiite extremists =97 may replicate the pattern American troops =20
have seen before when they have embarked on major offensives =97 of =20
=93melting away=94 only to return later. Some officers report scattered =20=

indications that some Shiite militiamen may already be heading for =20
safer havens in southern Iraq, calculating that they can wait the new =20=

offensive out before returning to the capital.

=93This is an enemy that will trade space for time,=94 one officer said.

Shiite neighborhoods present special challenges. Tightly woven =20
networks of militias backed by the government, the areas have been =20
largely off-limits to American forces. An early test will be Sadr =20
City, the largest Shiite enclave in the capital, and the main =20
stronghold for the Mahdi Army militia, led by the renegade cleric, =20
Moktada al-Sadr. American officers say it is far from clear that the =20
Maliki government will permit American troops to operate freely in =20
the enclave.

The number of Americans to be based at the new joint security centers =20=

is another matter under debate. At a minimum, according to officers =20
involved in the planning, there will be an American platoon, about 30 =20=

to 40 troops, working from each new center, with another platoon =20
patrolling nearby, serving as both a quick reaction force to quell =20
any surge of violence in the area and also to protect the Americans =20
stationed with the Iraqis.

That places American soldiers directly in neighborhoods where, until =20
now, they have appeared only transiently on patrols and raids. Under =20
the new plan, they will work closely with the Iraqi Army and police =20
in an attempt to establish a trust that has been elusive. The =20
approach has been modeled on a successful American campaign effort 18 =20=

months ago in Tal Afar, a northern city that saw dramatic drops in =20
violence and is now regarded as one of the few success stories of the =20=

American campaign.

The Tal Afar strategy was developed by Col. H. R. McMaster, commander =20=

of the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment at the time. Colonel McMaster, =20
who is widely regarded within the Army as one of its most creative =20
counterinsurgency thinker, as well as something of a maverick, has =20
been involved in Pentagon planning for the new Baghdad operation. But =20=

unlike Tal Afar, Baghdad is at the heart of the country, with nearly =20
a quarter of Iraq=92s population, and American officers say that =20
success here will be far more complex than in the operation =20
masterminded by Colonel McMaster.

Another senior officer involved in developing the new plan said that =20
the new crackdown would have been much easier to implement if it had =20
been adopted earlier. He said that when he returned to Iraq for a =20
second tour in the fall, he was shocked to see how far the American =20
war effort had regressed, something he attributed to muddled =20
strategy. =93When I got back three months ago, the hodge-podge called =20=

Baghdad was like a Rubik=92s cube gone awry,=94 he said.

In embattled West Baghdad, the plan is to place the new security =20
centers squarely where the sectarian fighting has been fiercest. One =20
of the first centers expected to begin operating is in Ghazaliya, a =20
Sunni enclave that has repeatedly come under assault from Shiite =20
militias.

That seems certain to pose early on the central question that =20
confronts American commanders as they start the plan: will the Maliki =20=

government agree to operations aimed at Shiite extremists, or resist =20
them and push for the focus to be laid on Sunni extremists attacking =20
Shiite areas?

American officers say that only time will tell, but that they will be =20=

surprised if Mr. Maliki and his top aides change colors, despite the =20
assurances the Iraqi leader is said to have offered President Bush. =20
As described by American commanders, the pattern in the eight months =20
since Mr. Maliki took office has been for the Shiite leaders who =20
dominate the new government to press the Americans to concentrate on =20
Sunni extremists.

The argument is that Shiite death squads, which have accounted for an =20=

almost equal number of deaths, are engaged in retaliatory attacks, =20
and that those will cease when the Sunni groups are rooted out.