[Texgreen] Pakistan makes an alliance with the Taliban

Roger Baker rcbaker@eden.infohwy.com
Thu, 1 Mar 2007 10:18:09 -0600


<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IC01Df03.html>

South Asia

Mar 1, 2007

Pakistan makes a deal with the Taliban
By Syed Saleem Shahzad

KARACHI - The Pakistani establishment has made a deal with the  
Taliban through a leading Taliban commander that will extend  
Islamabad's influence into southwestern Afghanistan and significantly  
strengthen the resistance in its push to capture Kabul.

One-legged Mullah Dadullah will be Pakistan's strongman in a corridor  
running from the Afghan provinces of Zabul, Urzgan, Kandahar and  
Helmand across the border into Pakistan's
Balochistan province, according to both Taliban and al-Qaeda contacts  
Asia Times Online spoke to. Using Pakistani territory and with  
Islamabad's support, the Taliban will be able safely to move men,  
weapons and supplies into southwestern Afghanistan.

The deal with Mullah Dadullah will serve Pakistan's interests in re-  
establishing a strong foothold in Afghanistan (the government in  
Kabul leans much more toward India), and it has resulted in a cooling  
of the Taliban's relations with al-Qaeda.

Despite their most successful spring offensive last year since being  
ousted in 2001, the Taliban realize they need the  assistance of a  
state actor if they are to achieve "total victory". Al-Qaeda will  
have nothing to do with the Islamabad government, though, so the  
Taliban had to go it alone.

The move also comes as the US is putting growing pressure on Pakistan  
to do more about the Taliban and al-Qaeda ahead of a much-anticipated  
spring offensive in Afghanistan. US Vice President Dick Cheney paid  
an unexpected visit to Pakistan on Monday to meet with President  
General Pervez Musharraf.

The White House refused to say what message Cheney gave Musharraf,  
but it did not deny reports that it included a tough warning that US  
aid to Pakistan could be in jeopardy.

A parting of the ways

The Taliban saw that after five years working with al-Qaeda, the  
resistance appeared to have reached a stage where it could not go  
much further.

Certainly it has grown in strength, and last year's spring offensive  
was a classic example of guerrilla warfare with the help of  
indigenous support. The application of improvised explosive devices  
and techniques of urban warfare, which the Taliban learned from the  
Iraqi resistance, did make a difference and inflicted major  
casualties against coalition troops.

However, the Taliban were unable to achieve important goals, such as  
the fall of Kandahar and laying siege to Kabul from the southern  
Musayab Valley on the one side to the Tagab Valley on the northern side.

Taliban commanders planning this year's spring uprising acknowledged  
that as an independent organization or militia, they could not fight  
a sustained battle against state resources. They believed they could  
mobilize the masses, but this would likely bring a rain of death from  
the skies and the massacre of Taliban sympathizers. Their answer was  
to find their own state resources, and inevitably they looked toward  
their former patron, Pakistan.

Al-Qaeda does not fit into any plans involving Pakistan, but mutual  
respect between the al-Qaeda leadership and the Taliban still exists.  
All the same, there is tension over their ideological differences,  
and al-Qaeda sources believe it is just a matter of time before the  
sides part physically as well.

Pakistan only too happy to help

Ever since signing on for the US-led "war on terror" after the  
September 11, 2001, attacks on the US, Pakistan has been coerced by  
Washington to distance itself from the Taliban. The Taliban were,  
after all, enemy No 1 for harboring Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda's  
training camps.

So when the opportunity arose, Islamabad was quick to tap up Mullah  
Dadullah. This was the perfect way in which Pakistan could revive its  
contacts in the Taliban and give the spring uprising some real  
muscle, so the argument went among the strategic planners in  
Rawalpindi - in fact, so much muscle that forces led by the North  
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would be forced into a position  
to talk peace - and who better than Pakistan to step in as peacemaker  
and bail out its Western allies?

The next logical step would be the establishment of a pro-Islamabad  
government in Kabul - delivering a kick in the strategic teeth of  
India at the same time. After all, Pakistan invested a lot in  
Afghanistan after the Soviet occupation in the 1980s yet it received  
little in return. Whether it was former Afghan premier Gulbuddin  
Hekmatyar or Taliban leader Mullah Omar, they refused to be totally  
Pakistan's men.

A man for all seasons

Mullah Dadullah, 41, comes from southwestern Afghanistan, so he is  
"original Taliban", and has a record of being a natural leader in  
times of crisis.

Mullah Dadullah made a name for himself during the Soviet occupation,  
during which he lost a leg. And with victories against the Northern  
Alliance after the Taliban took over Kabul in 1996, he pushed the  
alliance into the tail end of Afghanistan. This made him Pakistan's  
darling from Day 1.

He was Mullah Omar's emissary in the two Waziristan tribal areas  
before the spring offensive of last year. Here he brokered a major  
deal between the Pakistani armed forces and the Pakistani Taliban.  
Pakistan had lost more than 800 soldiers in operations against the  
Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaeda and it needed a face-saving way to  
extricate itself from the mess.

Mullah Dadullah's peace deal provided this, and the army made an  
"honorable" withdrawal from the volatile semi-independent region.  
Whenever the ceasefire was violated, Mullah Dadullah would settle  
things down.

The 2006 spring offensive was veteran mujahideen fighter Jalaluddin  
Haqqani's show. Nevertheless, the main areas of success were not  
Haqqani's traditional areas of influence, such as southeastern  
Afghanistan's Khost, Paktia and Paktika. The Taliban secured major  
victories in their heartland of the southwest, Helmand, Zabul, Urzgan  
and Kandahar. And their leader was Mullah Dadullah, whose men seized  
control of more than 12 districts - and held on to them.

Pakistani strategic circles are convinced that as a proven military  
commander, Mullah Dadullah will be able to work wonders this spring  
and finally give the Taliban the edge over the Kabul administration  
and its NATO allies.

This, ultimately, is Pakistan's objective - to revive its role in  
Kabul - and Islamabad is optimistic that Dadullah's considerable  
diplomatic skills will enable him to negotiate a power-sharing  
formula for pro-Pakistan Afghan warlords.

Even if Mullah Omar disagrees about any major compromise, Islamabad  
believes that Dadullah would by then have made such a name for  
himself in the battle against NATO that Omar would have little option  
but to accept whatever terms were agreed on.

A new string in the Taliban bow

A notable addition to what can only be described as a limited Taliban  
arsenal this year is surface-to-air missiles, notably the SAM-7,  
which was the first generation of Soviet man-portable SAMs.

The Taliban acquired these missiles in 2005, but they had little idea  
about how to use them effectively. Arab al-Qaeda members conducted  
extensive training programs and brought the Taliban up to speed.  
Nevertheless, the SAM-7s, while useful against helicopters, were no  
use against the fighter and bomber aircraft that were doing so much  
damage.

What the Taliban desperately needed were sensors for their missiles.  
These detect aircraft emissions designed to misdirect the missiles.

And it so happened that Pakistan had such devices, having acquired  
them from the Americans, though indirectly. The Pakistanis retrieved  
them from unexploded cruise missiles fired into Afghanistan in 1998,  
targeting bin Laden. They copied and adapted them to fit other  
missiles, including the SAMs.

Now that the Taliban and Pakistan have a deal, these missiles will be  
made available to the Taliban. Much like the Stingers that changed  
the dynamics of the Afghan resistance against the Soviets, the SAMs  
could help turn things Mullah Dadullah's, the Taliban's and  
Pakistan's way.

Syed Saleem Shahzad is Asia Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief. He  
can be reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com.

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